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THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM
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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN A FREE
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMEER CrEDIT CODE
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code has gone
through several drafts to date. This article is addressed to the latest
version, Working Draft No. 6, dated December 4, 1967. References
to the Code or to the "U3C" are to Working Draft No. 6, unless
otherwise specified.' The U3C itself is the product of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was pains-
takingly drafted by the Conference2 and has been subjected to
thorough and highly critical review by various members of an ad-
visory committee which consists of representatives of different kinds
of lending organizations and representatives of various consumer or
public groups.
The USC is designed to replace a myriad of piecemeal and non-
uniform state laws3 dealing with such consumer credit transactions
Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University.
1 Copies of Working Draft No. 6 of the U3C may be obtained, to the extent
available, from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
1155 E. 60th St., Chicago, M11. 60637. See footnote 1 of Prof. Spanogle's article, this
issue, for explanation of "USC" citation.
2 The principal draftsmen have been Professors William D. Warren and Robert
L. Jordan, both of the University of California School of Law, Los Angeles (UCLA),
and they have been assisted by Professor Robert W. Johnson, School of Industrial
Administration, Purdue University. A number of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws have personally participated in the project, and consultants and researchers
have also participated in various capacities.
A public hearing on the U3C was conducted in Chicago on June 16-17, 1967,
attended by members of the advisory committee and others. That hearing considered
a prior draft of the U3C and consisted of both written memoranda and oral pre-
sentations. See Proceedings, Public Hearing on Second Tentative Draft of the Pro-
posed Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which may be obtained from the National
Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1155 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill.
60637. [Hereinafter cited as Proceedings.]
3 For a thorough analysis of existing consumer credit laws as of a few years ago,
see CuRRAN, Tmms iN CONSUMRa CRErr LEGISLATION (1965). For a briefer analysis by
the same author, see Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer.Credit
Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. R.xv. 409 (1967).
For some of the background, see Jordan and Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code
for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & Co.s. L. REv. 441 (1967). [Hereinafter cited
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(and sometimes other credit transactions as well) as retail installment
sales,4 revolving credit agreements or so-called "revolving budget"
agreements, small loans,6 bank installment loans,7 second mortgage
loans," and assignments of wages or earnings," and is further designed
to replace the general laws relating to limitations on interest and
usury.10
The "substantive" provisions dealing with consumer credit sales
and leases and consumer loans are found in articles two and three
of the UC."1 The draftsmen considered it preferable to separate
substantive treatment of consumer credit sales (and leases) from that
of consumer loans. This accords with the traditional separation of
credit sales and loans arising under the time-price doctrine with
regard to sales.' 2 However, because the provisions of Article 2 on sales
and Article 3 on loans are for the most part parallel in coverage and
quite similar in language and draftsmanship, it is expedient to con-
sider the two articles together.
as Jordan & Warren.] Current news of the consumer credit project is given in virtually
every issue of the PERSONAL FINANcE LAw QUARTERLY REPORT.
Texas has varied to some degree from the general trend of enacting piecemeal
legislation, by enacting in 1967 a comprehensive statute regulating most consumer
credit transactions, including loans of $2,500 or less and most retail installment sales.
The language and form of the Texas statutes is rather similar to that found in many
of the separated and piecemeal consumer credit statutes found in other states. Tax.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 5069 (Supp. 1967).
4 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.01-.11 (Page 1962).
5 E.g., OHIo Ra,. CODE ANN. § 1317.11 (Page 1962).
6 E.g., Ouio R v. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.01-.19 (Page 1962).
7 Loans payable in installments or by means of periodic deposits are permitted
on the part of banks under a provision of the new Ohio Banking Code, Onto REv,
CODE ANN. § 1107.26 (Page Supp. 1967). A similar provision of former law applied to
"special plan" banks, similar to industrial banks of other states. Onio REv. CoDE ANN,
§ 1115.10 (Page 1953 now repealed).
Some states have rather extensive installment loan statutes applicable to such
loans by banks. E.g., N.Y. BANK. LAw § 108 (McKinney 1950).
8 E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 132151-.60 (Page Supp. 1967).
9 E.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.31-.33 (Page 1962).
10 E.g., OHio Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 1343.01-.05 (Page 1962).
11 In a manner analogous to that of the Uniform Commercial Code, the USC is
organized in numbered articles and sections, i.e., "U3C § 2.101."
12 Under the time-price doctrine, a credit sale may be made at a higher price
than that charged for a cash sale of the same item of property, and such price dif-
ferential is not "interest" within the ambit of the usury law limitations on interest.
The time-price doctrine has been the law of most states, including Ohio. See 54 01o
JUR. 2D Usury § 13 (1962). Credit sales, however, are subject to retail installment sales




II. DISCLOSURE OF FINANCING RATES
A. Simple Annual Interest
The most controversial subject in the entire area of consumer
credit has been that relating to required disclosure of the essential
terms of a consumer credit transaction in such a manner as to enable
a consumer to have some meaningful information as to what he
must pay for credit, and thus to enable him to "shop" for credit by
comparing the rates of different credit extenders.13 There are state
disclosure statutes of various kinds.14 At the federal level considerable
attention has been directed to legislation that would require written
disclosure to the borrower in a consumer credit transaction of the
cost of his credit in terms that he should presumably understand.
Such disclosure will require that the finance charge be stated as a
simple annual percentage rate of interest. The federal Truth in
Lending Act'5 contemplates that states will adopt laws requiring
disclosure in a manner substantially similar to the federal require-
ments.10
The U3C provisions on disclosure have been drafted to coincide
with expected Congressional thinking, and it would seem that ulti-
mately the UC disclosure provisions17 must depend on the Con-
gressional action taken. Since most of the Congressional proposals
to date had called for disclosure in terms of an annual percentage
rate of interest,* that method is followed in the current draft of the
USC.18
To cover the credit sale and consumer loan dichotomy, the dis-
closure provisions are double-jointed. They do not apply to sales
"other than sales of interests in land" or to leases,19 where the
13 See Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 Urczt.
L. Rav. 1285 (1966); 18 VAND. L. REv. 856 (1965).
14 For summary of some state disclosure statutes, see 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 464
(1967).
For a decision dealing with the effect of non-disclosure under a state statute, see
American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435. 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
See Annot., 14 A.L.R.Sd 330 (1967).
'5 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 1968 United States Code, Cong. and Admin. News 1232.
16 Id. at 1245.
17 USC § 2.301 et seq. apply to credit sales and § 3.301 et seq. apply to loans.
1S See USC § 2.301 et seq. Working Draft No. 4, prepared earlier in 1967, had
required disclosure in terms of dollars per one hundred dollars per year.
* This article was in galley proofs when the Truth in Lending Act was enacted.
The editors have made some adjustments, but some anachronisms necessarily
appear.-ED.
19 The general coverage of Article 2 with respect to consumer credit sales and
consumer leases is set forth in USC §§ 2.102, 2.104 and 2.106.
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amount involved is 25,000 dollars or more.20 Similarly, the disclosure
provisions do not apply to loans21 other than those "secured pri-
marily by an interest in land" of 25,000 dollars or more.22
For the ordinary consumer installment credit sale or loan, the
key requirement is disclosure of the approximate annual percentage
rate of the finance charge, where the charge is ten dollars or more,23
calculated under what is termed in the U3C as the "United States
rule."24 For example, assume that 500 dollars is financed for four
months at a total service charge of $12.56. The total balance to be
repaid is $512.56 and the monthly payment is $128.14. A monthly
interest rate of one percent will satisfy the rule;25 and that rate would
be multiplied by twelve to give an annual rate of twelve percent
which must be disclosed.26 "Approved" tables will likely be compiled
for use by credit sellers and lenders which will carry rates expressed
in terms of annual percentages for varying amounts and number of
installments of credit.27
In addition to the annual percentage rate, other elements must
also be disclosed in the ordinary consumer credit transaction. Where
there is a credit sale, the cash price, the down payment (including
trade-in allowance), license fees, official or filing fees, insurance
premiums, certain "permitted" additional charges, the credit service
charge, the total unpaid balance, and the number of payments, in-
cluding the amount and due date of each, must be disclosed.2 8 These
requirements are similar to those of a number of existing retail in-
stallment sales statutes.20 Analogous requirements of itemization and
20 U3C § 2.301(1).
21 The general coverage of the disclosure provisions of Article 3 with respect to
consumer loans is set forth in U3C §§ 3.302, 8.304, and 3.306.
22 U3C § 3.301(1).
23 UC §§ 2.306(3), 3.306(2)(j).
24 "United States rule" indicates the actuarial method of allocating payments
made on a debt between principal or amount financed and loan finance
charge or credit service charge, pursuant to which a payment is applied first
to the accumulated loan finance charge or credit service charge and the bal-
ance is applied to the unpaid principal or amount financed. U3C § 1.801(15).
25 Complete mathematical accuracy is not required. A calculation of the rate
which will equal the finance charge to the nearest whole dollar is all that is necessary.
USC §§ 2.304(2), 3.304(2).
26 The example in the comment to U3C § 2.304, while illustrating the proper
method, has been garbled by the misplacing of decimal points. The figures there
illustrate an annual rate of 120%, not 12% as indicated.
27 The enforcing agency is empowered to publish guidelines, in the form of tables
or otherwise, for determining rates to be disclosed. U3C §§ 2.304(7), 8.304(7).
28 U3C § 2.306(2).
29 See, e.g., the present Ohio Retail Installment Sales statute. Oto Rpv. CorE
ANN. § 1317.04 (Page 1962).
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disclosure of the elements of a consumer loan also exist.' ° This, too,
has counterparts in existing small loan statutes 3 '
Some additional provisions of the U3G require disclosure where
there is refinancing of an existing credit,3 2 consolidation of creditsim
or deferment of one or more due payments.3 4 Disclosure is also called
for where installment loans'are made pursuant to the use of a credit
card or similar arrangement 35 and where a consumer lease is entered
into which is payable in installments."0 Disclosure on an estimated
basis is permitted, since advance disclosure may at times be impos-
sible.3 7 The debtor, however, is entitled to a copy of any writing
which he signs38 Where a sale or lease is arranged by mail or
telephone, the required disclosure may be made within a reasonable
time, and before the first installment is due.89 Where a loan is ar-
ranged by mail, disclosure is necessary at the time of reciept of the
proceeds of the loan by the debtor 40 Where the credit is repayable
30 USC § 3.506(2).
31 The present Ohio Small Loans Act requires delivery to the borrower of a
statement of the amount and date of the loan, a schedule of payments or a description
thereof, the type of security, the name and address of the licensed office of the lending
organization and of each borrower, and "the agreed rate of charge," or in lieu thereof,
a copy of all obligations signed by the borrower. A copy of a lengthy statutory provi-
sion is also required to be furnished to the borrower. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1321.14(A)
(Page 1962). Apparently, all borrowers are assumed to be able to read and understand
the wording of lengthy statutes, at least as well as law students. Somewhat similar
requirements exist with respect to certain second mortgage loans in Ohio. See Oslo
REva. COD AN'. § 1321.58 (Page Supp. 1967).
32 USC § 2.07.
33 USC §§ 2.508, 8.507. This refers to consolidation of the amount owed on a
previous credit sale or loan with a current credit sale or additional loan. See USC
§§ 206, S.206.
34 UBC §§ 2..09, 3.508.
85 USC § 3.310, which requires basic disclosure of the rate and additional charges
before a credit card installment loan is made and which then refers to UC § 3.506
for other disclosure requirements similar to those for other installment loans after a
credit card loan is made. This does not apply to revolving credits.
36 UC § 2.311 contains no requirement of disclosure of an annual percentage
rate, since there is no "interest" normally connected with a lease. This raises,
however, the question whether credit sales can be disguised as installment leases by
those who desire to avoid disclosure on the basis of an annual percentage rate.
37 UC §§ 2.502(4), 8.802(4), which permit disclosure of estimates of the required
information with an indication that such are estimates where "it is not commercially
feasible" to give the exact information.
38 USC §§ 2.802(5), 3.302(5).
39 USC § 2.805.
40 USC § 8.505, w'Aich, perhaps on the assumption that no loans are ever made by
telephone, makes no provision for such loans. It might also be noted that no provision
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in installments, but one of the installments is not equal to the others,
or where the due date of the first payment is not equal to the interval
between installment payments, or where provision is made for dis-
pensing with an installment payment in any one or more payment
periods, disclosure of the rate may be made as if the debt is payable
under an agreement having the same amount or principal, the same
term or maturity, and "a regular schedule of payments having the
same interval between payments as under the actual contract." 41
The U3C also restricts to some extent the content of advertising
in connection with consumer credits. False advertising concerning
the terms and conditions of a credit or loan is prohibited.4 2 In gen-
eral, advertising of consumer credit transactions need not follow the
"disclosure" requirements; however, if credit or loan advertising
states the rate or dollar amount of credit or finance charge or the
amount of installment payments, then the advertisement must dis-
close the rate in terms of a simple annual percentage." Guidelines as
to the kinds of advertising permitted may be issued by supervisory
authorities.44
B. Disclosure Where There Is A Revolving Credit
Where a credit of fixed amount is extended on a set date for
a definite term repayable in equal installments of equal amounts
during equal intervals of time, the terms of the credit are predict-
able. Even to calculate a simple annual interest rate in percentage for
such a predictable credit requires a degree of mathematical wizardry
beyond the ken of the average individual, including the average
attorney, law student, or law faculty member. However, the use of
tables will probably make it possible even for sales or clerical per-
sonnel of credit sellers or installment lenders to compute for each
loan the simple annual percentage rate that must be disclosed. In
any event, such credits consist of constants which make computa-
tion of an annual percentage rate possible at the inception of the
credit.
On the other hand, where a revolving credit is created under
is made for cases where the proceeds of a loan are not directly advanced to the debtor
but are used to pay a third person, such as a seller, the fact situation of Ohio Loan
& Discount Co. v. Tyarks, 173 Ohio St. 564, 184 N.E2d 874 (1962).
41 USC §§ 2.304(8), 3.304(3), which in effect permit disclosure of such "Irregular"
loans as if they were for the same total term and same amount but repayable in sub-
stantially equal payments over equal periods of time.
42 USC §§ 2.303(1), 3.303(l) which might be said generally to "prohibit sin."
43 USC §§ 2.303(2), 3.303(2). Some exemption exists for chasges of $10 or less.
44 USC §§ 2.303(3), 3.303(3).
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a credit card, charge account, or check loan or overdraft by a bank,
variables exist which make it impossible to compute an accurate
rate on an annual percentage basis. In the typical revolving credit
situation, there may be no service or finance charge where payment
is made within a fixed period, such as thirty days after the date the
bill is sent.4 5 After such period a service or finance charge might be
computed at a certain rate, such as one and a half percent per month,
on the average unpaid balance during the next month or on the
unpaid balance as of a certain date in the next month. The actual
rate measured on a monthly or annual percentage basis will increase
or decrease because of such variables as the time and amount of new
purchases or credit extensions or the time and amounts of payments
made.
The draftsmen of the UBC recognized the practical impossibility
of making accurate advance disclosure in a revolving credit situation
on the basis of a simple annual percentage rate; they merely required
disclosure at the time the account is opened of the conditions under
which a service or finance charge is to be made, the method of com-
putation, and description of any additional charges made. In the
usual revolving credit situation this must be stated as a percentage
and the equivalent annual rate must be given.40 Certain information
must be given at each monthly billing including the same informa-
tion as to rates as is required at the inception of the arrangement
47
Although revolving charge account sales and revolving loan trans-
actions are separately treated with respect to disclosure require-
ments,48 the treatment is so similar as to be identical for all practical
purposes. In fact, if a person makes both revolving credit sales and
revolving credit loans, he may treat all transactions the same and
need give only a single statement at the time any statement is re-
quired.49
45 For example, a purchase may be made on December 1, the billing may be
made as of January 2; payment in full received by February 1 will excuse any service
or finance charge. Thus virtually two months of free credit are possible. On the other
hand, another purchase may be made on December 31, which is caught in the same
January bill. Only one month of free credit exists as to this second purchase.
46 USC §§ 2.310(1), 3.309(1). For example, if a charge is made at the rate of 1I4
percent of the average daily balance in the account for the month, exclusive of pur-
chases made that month (a typical revolving charge account arrangement) such must
be disclosed and the equivalent annual percentage rate of 18% must be stated.
47 USC §§ 2.310(2), 3.309(2).
48 USC § 2.310 (revolving credit sales or sales pursuant to revolving charge ac-
counts); USC § 3.309 (revolving loan accounts).
49 USC §§ 2.310(3), 3.309(3). An example where one person might be both a seller
on revolving credit and a revolving credit lender might arise where a particular credit
1968]
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In summary, disclosure in connection with a revolving credit is
sufficient if it merely states the conditions under which a charge is
made and the monthly rate and basis multiplied by twelve. It is not
necessary for the credit extender to be a fortune-teller and estimate
the rate based on actual charges incurred and payments made.
It is irony indeed that during the decade in which adherents
of 'truth-in-lending' legislation fought so valiantly for its passage,
the only sales transaction in which disclosure on an annual
interest basis can be made with accuracy-the closed-end install-
ment sale-was greatly diminishing in importance in all but
high-price transactions like the sale of automobiles. This was
due to the rapid growth of revolving credit, and if this trend
continues, 'truth-in-lending' legislation may well offer a solu-
tion to a problem that has largely disappeared.50
C. Disclosure: Does The U3C Do The Job?
The disclosure requirements of the U3C must, of necessity, con-
form with those of any federal enactment, but the provisions pro-
posed in the current draft of the U3C are ones with which a legiti-
mate lender or credit seller can live.51 The U30 draftsmen appear
to have been more realistic than certain elected public servants in
not expecting the impossible or the extremely impracticable in con-
nection with "truth in lending." It is hoped that no ultimate Con.
gressional enactment on the subject will be so politically motivated
as to ignore the realities and force into an unacceptable mold any
state legislation dealing with disclosure.
A few comments might be in order. First, USC disclosure re-
quirements, unlike those of some prior statutes, do not prescribe
exact formats in sales or loan contracts, such as signatures, size of
type, notice to the buyer or borrower, and the like.52 Since there are
many kinds of, credit sellers, some statutory format might perhaps
be desirable. This might be covered by a comment, when comments
card issued by a selling organization is used both to charge sales of products of that
company through its own outlets and sales by independents, who write up charge sales
and turn them over to the company, which bills the customer directly. See Jordan &
Warren, supra note 3, at 446.
50 Jordan & Warren, supra note 3, at 446-47.
51 This presupposes that the purpose of any consumer credit legislation is to
regulate reasonably and not to "kill the goose that laid the golden eggs," thus making
loan sharks the sole source of consumer credit.
52 For example, the "Unruh Act" dealing with retail installment sales In Call-
fornia has a number of requirements as to provisions and sometimes exact wording to
be included in a retail installment sales contract and, in some instances tie size of type
to be used. See CALF. Civ. Coma ch. 1803 (West Supp. 1967).
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are finally drafted. The great majority of sellers and lenders who
desire to obey the law might find such guidance helpful. It might
also be desirable to require disclosure of any balloon payment (where
permitted) in some conspicuous manner. Furthermore, although it
is probably impracticable to forbid blanks completely, some form of
statutory protection for the consumer or borrower who signs a blank
contract or obligation might be desirable.53
III. RATE LIITATIONS
A. Rate Ceilings and Usury
The USG makes some fundamental changes in the general law
with respect to credit ceilings or maximum rates. It does away with
general usury laws which limit the "contract" rate5" charge for the
use of money.5 5 This is justified on the following grounds:
... [U]sury laws imposing inflexible price ceilings on money
and credit are historical vestiges of the supposition that em-
perors, kings and governments could effectively fix all prices; the
need to escape the rigidity of usury laws has led to special laws,
which only the expert can find or understand, for each type of
credit transaction requiring a charge higher than the usury
rate.56
The U3C might have been drafted as an exception to the
general usury laws, thus permitting higher rates with respect to
consumer credit while leaving the general usury laws operative in
areas of non-consumer credit.57 For a number of reasons, such an ap-
53 Suggestions here are difficult, but it might be provided that a copy of the
completed contract be furnished the debtor promptly upon completion, and that the
debtor be given a period in which to question the accuracy of the completion and
possibly to rescind the transaction if the completed form does not conform with the
debtor's understanding. For examples of what might be possible see U3C §§ 2.501-.505
on home solicitation sales.
54 Existing state usury laws set a "legal" or "judgment" rate of interest when
the rate is not otherwise stipulated and a "contract" rate, which is the highest rate
that may be charged by agreement of the parties. In many states the permitted "con-
tract" rate is higher than the "legal" rate. The intent of the USC draftsmen is to do
away with general "contract" rate limitations, although preserving "legal" or "judg-
ment" rates. In Ohio, the "contract" rate is 8 percent; the "legal" rate is 6 percent.
OrnO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1343.01 (contract rate) and 1343.03 (legal rate) (Page 1962).
55 U3C §§ 2.605 and 3.605 expressly permit the parties to agree in writing to any
service charge in the case of credit sales or loans which are not subject to the various
ceilings or protective provisions of the UC. In addition, USC § 9.102 expressly calls
for the repeal of laws relating to usury in general.
56 Prefatory Note to Working Draft No. 6, UC, at 2 (1967).
57 This is similar to the present statutory scheme of many states whereby there
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proach was not followed. It is more in keeping with our economic
development to limit rate ceilings only on those loans which need
limitation, leaving it to "free enterprise" to limit rates on such loans
as those of large amounts made to business organizations. 58 Further-
more, general usury laws have often failed to protect consumer credit
sale transactions because of the time-price doctrine, which holds that
a sale in a free market on credit might be made at a higher price than
a cash sale and that such a higher credit price is not a loan of
money.59 Moreover, there is at least a slight possibility that the
statutory combination of a general usury law and special higher
rates for certain kinds of loans or credit transactions might run into
state constitutional difficulties.60 In any event the maximum limits
of general usury laws are too low to afford any practical protection to
the consumer.6' In fact, general usury laws in many states have the
sole effect of setting rate ceilings on commercial-type loans, as to which
price-control protection is hardly needed. Finally, although general
usury laws ordinarily carry maximum rates too low to give adequate
protection at a realistic level, such general usury laws may present an
unexpected trap to unwary lenders in commercial credit transac-
tions. 62 Although abolition of general usury rate limitations will
seem to many to be a radical change in the law and thus subject to
is a general usury law setting a maximum contract rate, accompanied by certain
exemptions, such as that for loans to corporations, and also accompanied by higher
rates with respect to consumer credit transactions.
68 This is the statutory scheme in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire,
which have no general usury laws, although certain credit transactions such as con-
sumer credits are regulated. The other states have "contract" rate limitations ranging
from 6 percent in New York and some other states to 21 percent in Rhode Island, The
rate limitation in Ohio is 8 percent. Onio Rxv. CoDE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page 1962).
69 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Agency, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp,,
156 Colo. 237, 398 P.2d 965 (1965) and Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America,
17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965). See 14 A.L.R.3d 1058 (1967).
60 Such a problem arose in Nebraska a few years ago under a state constitutional
provision prohibiting "special laws" fixing interest rates, in Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb.
483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 377 U.S. 973 (1964). It is not
likely, however, to arise in Ohio which lacks a similar constitutional provision.
61 Legitimate consumer lenders could not operate profitably while making con-
sumer installment loans at rates permitted by general usury laws. See Curran, Legis-
lative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & Con. L.
REv. 409, 411 (1967) which points out that this inability to operate profitably brought
about the Uniform Small Loan Law of the Russell Sage Foundation which now exists
in some form in many states.
62 See, e.g., Hollamon v. First State Bank, 389 P.2d 352 (Okla. 1963). In that case
a bank loan of $20,000, repayable in 23 monthly installments of $1,000 each, was held
to exceed the 10 percent per year usury limit.
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condemnation, this writer finds the preferable approach is to do
away with all existing rate ceilings and make a new start with the
realistic rate ceilings of a uniform consumer credit code.63
In practice, not too many loans are freed from the statutory rate
ceilings by the suggested repeal of general usury laws. The U3C sets
rate ceilings for consumer credit transactions. Furthermore, there
are rate ceilings covering non-consumer credit extensions to indi-
viduals in the amount of 25,000 dollars or less. Most corporate credits
and all credits over 25,000 dollars, however, are freed of rate ceil-
ings.64
B. Specific Rate Limitations
Another unusual approach taken in the USC with respect to
maximum rates is to set rate ceilings that are rather high, often
much higher than those under statutes which the USG will. replace.
The draftsmen here recognized the risk that
too low ceiling rates, too substantial restrictions on creditors'
rights and remedies, or too great enhancements of debtors' rights
or remedies, might deprive the less credit-worthy of lawful
sources of credit and drive them to "loan sharks" and other
illegal credit grantors in whose hands they will enjoy no legal
protections.65
In short, the setting of restrictively low ceiling rates would merely
deny credit extension by any reputable organization to the marginal
borrower and relegate such borrower to those who operate illegally.06
High maximum rates are also justified on the ground that a maxi-
mum ceiling on a credit sale is of limited utility, since the seller can
exceed the ceiling by merely raising the price of the articles sold.67
63 There will be an added problem in a few states where the usury limitations
are embodied in state constitutions. Arkansas illustrates the extreme rigidity in this
regard with its constitutional ceiling of 10 percent per year. Am CoNST., art. 19, § 13.
61 A person who can borrow over $25,000 is probably "sophisticated" enough to
bargain for reasonably favorable rates. In practice, the rates on such larger loans
should rarely come dose to the 18 percent figure limiting individual nonconsumer
loans of $25,000 or less.
65 Prefatory Note to Working Draft No. 6, USC, at 3 (1967) which also points
out that it was the "loan shark" evil that the Russell Sage Foundation proposed to
remedy with its Uniform Small Loan Law.
06 There are no penal provisions in the USC directed at loan sharks. Such lenders
are already subject to the penalties of prohibitory statutes in many jurisdictions. The
U3C approach is to make rates high enough so that reputable lenders may operate.
This should result in legitimate lenders charging rates that are considerably lower
than those charged by illegal operators.
67 Jordan & Warren, supra note 3, at 451. The authors, who are also the principal
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The rate limitations for consumer credit sales and consumer
loans are set forth currently in two alternatives. The first permits
eighteen dollars per 100 dollars per year on the first 300 dollars,
twelve dollars per 100 dollars per year on the amount from 300
dollars to 1,000 dollars and eight dollars per 100 dollars per year on
amounts over 1,000 dollars. The second permits percentages per year
on unpaid balances of thirty-six percent on the first 300 dollars,
twenty-one percent on the amount from 300 dollars to 1,000 dollars,
and fifteen percent on the amount over 1,000 dollars. In lieu of either
alternative, a flat eighteen percent per year on the unpaid balance
is also permitted.68 In the case of a revolving credit, the maximum
rate may not exceed two percent per month on the amount out-
standing 9 which is 500 dollars or less and one and a half percent
on that part of the amount over 500 dollars.70
The maximum rates apply to all consumer credits, regardless of
the identity of the lender. In other words, the U3C does not (like
some prior statutes) set one rate for small loan companies or personal
finance companies, another rate for banks making installment loans,
still another rate for retail installment sales, and perhaps varying
rates for retail installment sales of motor vehicles dependent upon
the model year of the vehicle. In any instance, however, where rates
are filed with and approved by a subdivision or agency of the en-
acting state or of the United States, the rate ceilings of the U3C do
not apply.71
Additional charges permitted include official fees, charges for
insurance, and "reasonable" charges "for other benefits conferred
upon" the debtor.72 In the case of a loan, a permitted additional
draftsmen of the U3C, point out that this would cause the cash buyer to pay part of
the credit charge in lieu of the credit buyer.
68 U3C §§ 2.201(2), 8.508(2) (drafted in alternatives). The flat 18 percent alter-
native rate is computed under the United States rule.
69 A formula is given for calculating the amount outstanding in USC §§ 2U,07(2),
3.509(2) to cover fluctuating amounts resulting from additional charges incurred dur.
ing the billing period or payments received during the billing period. The amount
may be computed on the average daily balance, the balance as of a certain day each
month, or the "median" amount.
70 U3C §§ 2.207(3), 3.509(3). Where the billing cycle is other than monthly, there
is provision for a statutory translation into monthly terms.
71 U3C §§ 2.211, 3.207. An example might be loans for home improvement guar-
anteed by the Federal Housing Administration, which may be made at rates per-
mitted by that agency.
72 U3C §§ 2.202, 83.202.
The provision for "reasonable" charges "for other benefits conferred upon" the
debtor is rather indefinite and might open the door to abuse. What is probably con-
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charge may include an annual fee for the privilege of using a credit
card, as where the credit card may be used in widespread purchases.7
The provision on additional charges may be criticized for in-
completeness. Some prior consumer credit statutes have spelled out
in more detail what additional charges are permissible. 74 In general,
it seems that additional charges are permitted by the USC for any
necessary and legitimate payments which are made to third persons.
Examples include insurance premiums, filing fees, and the like.
Some closing fees, if reasonable and related to actual handling ex-
penses, might also be separately collected. 8
Other charges permitted include delinquency charges,18 charges
where one or more payments are deferred,77 charges where a credit
is refinanced,78 and charges permitted where a new credit sale or
loan is consolidated with a prior credit sale or loan. 9 A charge may
also be made where the creditor makes an advance to perform
certain duties normally required of the buyer, such as insuring or
preserving the collateral.80
The U3G gives the buyer the right to prepay in full any con-
sumer credit without penalty.81 Upon such prepayment in full, a
rebate is required under the familiar "rule of seventy-eights." 82
templated here are charges for possible benefits or services given the debtor, such as
a charge per check drawn in a check loan, or possible service or dosing charges. Abuse
in this area might be limited by a provision permitting the state official charged with
enforcement of the USC to adopt rules as to additional charges. USC §§ 2.202(2),
3.202(2).
73 USC § 3.202(I)(c). There is no equivalent in connection with credit sales.
74 This is not so in Ohio. The chief additional charge permitted in a retail in-
stallment sales contract is a "service charge" dependent on the term of the credit and
the principal balance. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.06(A)(2) (Page 1962). A separate
charge for insurance is also permitted. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.04(D), 1317.05
(Page 1962). For charges in connection with small loans, see Onio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1321.13 (Page 1962).
75 Abuses are possible in connection with excessive dosing fees and also in con-
nection with such matters as broker's or finder's fees.
76 USC §§ 2.203, 3.203.
77 USC §§ 2.204, 3.204.
78 UC §§ 2.205, 3.205.
79 USC §§ 2.206, 3.206.
80 USC §§ 2.208, 3.208.
81 USC §§ 2.209, 3209. The Comment points out that there is no right to prepay
a sale of an interest in real property or to make a partial prepayrnent
82 U3C §§ 2.210, 3.210. A somewhat similar rule exists in connection with retail
installment sales in Ohio. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.09 (Page 1962).
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C. Rate Ceilings for Non-Consumer Credit
Although the repeal of general usury laws is contemplated, some
non-consumer credit sale and loan transactions are also subjected to
rate ceilings. These consist of credits of 25,000 dollars or less where
the debtor is an individual, or where the debtor is an organization
and the debt is secured primarily by a security interest in a one or
two family dwelling occupied by a person related to the organiza-
tion.13 In addition, when a credit sale is involved, the special non-
consumer ceiling governs where " ... the credit is granted by a seller
who regularly engages in credit transactions as a seller." 84 There is
no ceiling on loans or credit sales over 25,000 dollars. There is also
no ceiling on non-consumer sales by a person not in the business of
selling on credit or on non-consumer credits to corporations or other
organizations, except where a one or two-family dwelling is used as
security.
Non-consumer credits which are subject to rate ceilings are
governed by a ceiling of eighteen percent per year on unpaid bal-
ances. In other words, there is a "partial usury law" of eighteen
percent on many non-consumer credit transactions. 5 However, the
parties may agree to subject any non-consumer credit transaction to
the provisions of the U3C applicable to consumer credit transac-
tions, 8  including the rate ceilings previously discussed, which often
may exceed eighteen percent.
Revolving credit transactions in the non-consumer category
discussed here are subject to the same maximum rates as consumer
revolving credits81 A special provision of the U3C exempts any con-
sumer loan with a rate of ten percent per year or less on unpaid
balances, which is not a revolving credit loan. 88
83 U3C §§ 2.602(1), 3.602(1). This sort of requirement would curb the abuse that
occasionally has existed where a loan is made on a dwelling house at excessive rates
and the lender requires the debtor to incorporate, as a condition to receiving the loan,
so that rates in excess of usury ceilings may be charged. See Jenkins v. Moyse, 254
N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930). UC § 1.301(12). defines the term "person related to"
with respect to an organization.
84 U3C § 2.602(l)(a). This would subject to non-consumer ceilings such sales as
agricultural equipment to a farmer, an automobile to a doctor for professional use,
and the like, if under $25,000.
85 USC §§ 2.602(2), 3.602(2).
86 USC §§ 2.601, 3.601.
87 USC §§ 2.602(3), 3.602(3).
88 U3C § 3.201.
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D. Summary of Rate Limitations
The USC sets rather high maximum rates on consumer credit
transactions, both sales and loans. In addition, certain other credit
transactions while not subject to other provisions of the USC, such as
those dealing with disclosure, are subject to the rate limitations.
The intent is to cover in one group of statutes all credit transactions
that should be subjected to rate ceilings in order to prevent abuse by
unscrupulous lenders. On the other hand, rate ceilings are eliminated
with respect to such loans as large business loans on the theory that
the rates are, and should be, governed by forces of normal competi-
tion among lenders. This realistic reappraisal of rate ceilings is a
most salutary reform and should of itself justify widespread enact-
ment of the U3C.
IV. LICENSING AND "NOnFICATION" REqUIRErmNTS
A basic tenet of those involved in drafting the U3C is that com-
petition should effectively determine the pricing of money and
credit. One means of furthering competition in the credit granting
field is to permit credit grantors ". . . relatively easy entry into the
market to avoid monopoly."5 19 This approach is carried out in the
U3C by not requiring the licensing of credit sellers or sales financing
companies90 Moreover, although the U3C follows the approach of
prior statutes91 in requiring the licensing of companies making so-
called "regulated" loans, 92 there are no restrictions on the number
of entrants into this field. In other words, there is no "convenience
89 Prefatory Note to Working Draft No. 6, U3C, at 2.
90 The Ohio Retail Installment Sales Act also has no licensing provisions for sales
finance companies. Omno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.01-.99 (Page 1969). On the other
hand, some states require licensing of those involved in retail installment sales. For
example, Florida requires an annual license for a retail installment seller, FLA. SrAT.
ANN. § 520.32(2) (Supp. 1968), and also for a sales finance company, FLA. STAT. Ax.%.
§ 520.52 (Supp. 1968). For some other statutes requiring licensing of sales finance com-
panies, see ILm. ANN. STAT. ch. 121/ § 403 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); N.Y. BANL LAw
ch. 492 (McKinney Supp. 1967). Banks and other financial organizations chartered and
regulated under other statutes are generally exempt from licensing requirements ap-
plicable to sales finance companies.
91 Many states have "small loan" laws, often derived from the Uniform Small
Loan Law devised many years ago by the Russell Sage Foundation, which among other
matters requires licensing of small loan companies. Ohio requires that small loan
companies be licensed. OHIO RrV. CODE ANN. §§ 321.02-.44 (Page 1962).
92 U3C §§ 3.501--507.
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and advantage" test as a condition to the issuance of a license.98 The
stated purpose of the USC licensing requirement is to facilitate
entry into the cash-loan field so that the resultant rate competition
fostered by disclosure will generally force rates below the permitted
maximum charges, with a secondary purpose of reducing the likeli-
hood of localized monopolies in the granting of credit, which would
tend to push rates to the maximum permitted levels.0 4 There is also
no restriction on the carrying on by a loan licensee of some other
business ". . . unless he carries on the business for the purpose of
evasion or violation of this Act."95
In other respects, the licensing provisions applicable to those
who make consumer loans are not unlike those of many prior small
loan statutes. It is provided that no one may make a "regulated"
loan, that is, a consumer loan, pursuant to a revolving credit account
or a consumer loan at a rate over ten percent per year on unpaid
balances96 without a license unless the lender is a bank, savings and
loan association, credit union, or other financial organization of
similar nature, chartered under state or federal law and authorized
by such law to make loans and receive deposits, savings or the like.07
Provision is made for application for a license,08 revocation or
suspension of a license,99 the keeping of books and records by
licensees,1 0 and examination or investigation of licensees by the
supervisory authority.101 It is also provided that administrative
action taken by the supervisory authority is to be governed by the
state administrative procedure act.102
The U3C licensing provisions are similar to, but much simpler
than, those of the small loan statutes which are to be replaced. They
apply to any consumer lender other than banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and the like. They would thus apply in
93 The basic licensing provision, USC § 3.503, requires only a finding of "... . fi-
nancial responsibility, character and fitness." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.04(B) (Page
1962), provides that a license may be granted if the Division of Securities finds that
allowing the applicant for a license "to engage in such business will promote the con.
venience and advantage of the community in which the licensed office is to be located."
94 USC § 3.503, Comment.
95 UMC § 3.514.
98 See USC § 3.501, which defines "regulated loan."
07 U3C § 3.502, which refers to USC § 1.301(14).
98 USC § 3.503.
19 USC § 3.504.
100 USC § 3.505.
101 USC § 3.506.
102 U3C & 3.507.
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some instances to lending organizations which are now governed by
different statutes in the same state. 03
While a person making consumer credit sales or consumer leases
is not required to obtain a license, such a person is required to
file a notification with the supervisory authority 4 and, if the credit
seller is a nonresident of the state or unqualified out-of-state cor-
poration,10 5 to appoint an agent for the service of process. Such
requirements apply also to consumer lenders (including those re-
quired to be licensed) and to ".... persons taking assignments or
obligations arising from [consumer] sales, leases, or loans, other than
assignments in bulk as security for loans."'100 A notification fee must
be paid by all persons who are required to fie notification. The
amount of the fee is based on the volume of credit outstanding.' °0
In general, the USC licensing provisions are commendable.
The approach of dispensing with licensing in connection with sales
financing, of simplifying license requirements for lenders, and of
permitting entry into the consumer loan field on a purely competi-
tive basis is preferable to the burdensome and often useless require-
ments of many prior statutes that seem primarily to raise the cost
of doing business and thus the cost of consumer credit. It is sug-
gested, however, that the licensing and notification requirements
overlap with respect to consumer lenders who make "regulated"
loans; therefore, it might be desirable to have the licensing process
serve as notification, and to have the notification fees paid by
licensees. This would presumably defray the expenses of super-
vision and examination of licensees,0 8 thus forcing credit users,
rather than taxpayers in general, to bear the expenses of enforcing
the U3C.10 9
103 Examples are three kinds of lenders in California governed by different stat-
utes, such as personal property brokers, governed by CAL. FIN. CODE § 22000 (West
1958); small loan companies, governed by CA.. FiN. CODE § 24000 (West. 1968); indus-
trial loan companies, governed by CAr. FwN. CoE § 18000 (West 1968). Pennsylvania
also has several kinds of lenders: small loan companies, governed by PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 7 § 6151 (1967), and consumer discount companies, governed by PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 7 § 6201 (1967).
104 U3C § 6.202.
105 U3C § 6.203.
106 U3C § 6.201.
107 USC § 6.204.
108 This is not a suggestion that sales finance companies or the like should be
licensed.
109 This is probably the situation with respect to most existing consumer credit
statutes. It might also be noted that such supervised financial institutions as banks,
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V. CONTRAcr LIMITATIONS
A. Contract Requirements and Prohibitions
The U3C confers a number of rights and benefits upon the
consumer which may not be waived or may be waived only after
default.110 Certain limitations on agreements and practices are ap-
plied to sales involving less than 25,000 dollars credit, leases for less
than 25,000 dollars, or loans of less than 25,000 dollars, but not to
real estate sales."' This avoids the imposition of contract terms that
unduly favor the creditor or burden the debtor, which may arise in
the smaller credit transactions because of unequal bargaining power
or the use of standard-form contracts or contracts of adhesion. The
U3C contains a number of protective provisions intended to relieve
the consumer from the effects of a hard bargain112
B. Home Solicitation Sales
The purpose of the U3C is to regulate credit, not to regulate
sales practices, quality of products sold, misleading advertisements,
or other non-credit matters; however, the U3C spills over to regu-
late a type of sale often associated with credit which has caused par-
ticular abuses. This is the "home solicitation sale." 1 8 Such sales often
involve a representative of a credit-selling organization who calls on
a family at home and through high pressure salesmanship induces
the purchase of grossly overpriced goods."14 The U3C approaches the
problem of such sales" 5 by giving the buyer the right to cancel up to
savings and loan associations, credit unions, and the like bear the expenses of exam-
ination and other supervision in virtually all states.
110 UC § 1.107.
Ill UBC §§ 2.401, 3.401.
112 Jordan & Warren, supra note 3, at 455.
"3S A lengthy discussion which highlights many of the abuses in home solicitation
sales, particularly where coupled with so-called "referral" plans, is found in State v.
ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d S03 (1966), an action by the New York Attorney
General to enjoin certain practices deemed "fraudulent and illegal."
114 See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.
Div. 1967), where a refrigerator-freezer was sold under such conditions to a person of
Spanish-speaking background, with the sales contract written in English. The facts are
given in a lower court opinion in the same case, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist.
Ct. 1966).
115 The USC definition of "home solicitation sale" contemplates a consumer
credit sale, payable in installments, of goods or services, where the solicitation is made
and the purchase order or offer is given "at a place other than a place of business of
the seller." Sales under revolving charge accounts or other sales completed at a
permanent store or similar establishment are exempted. Sales arising from solicitations
by mail or telephone are probably not included, although this matter might be
clarified.
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midnight of the third day after the buyer signs the order, by giving
written notice to the seller at the address stated in the order.116
Such notice may be given by mail and is deemed given at the time
sent.117 The agreement in a home solicitation sale must be signed by
the buyer, must state the seller's address and must contain a pre-
scribed form of notice of the buyer's right to cancel. 18 Failure to
comply with these requirements gives the buyer the absolute right to
cancel until such time as there has been compliance.119 Where the
buyer cancels, the seller may retain a fixed amount as a cancellation
fee.'2o Within ten days after cancellation the seller must tender to
the buyer any payments made, any note or evidence of indebtness
given, and any goods traded in or an amount equal to the trade-in
allowance given.' 12 The buyer has a lien on goods delivered under
the cancelled contract to insure return of these items,' 2- but on de-
mand by the seller he must make such goods available. If the seller
does not make such demand within a reasonable period (presumably
forty days) the buyer may keep such goods without payment. While
the goods remain in the buyer's possession, he has the duty only to
use reasonable care toward them. The seller is entitled to no com-
pensation other than the cancellation fee for services performed
prior to cancellation.23
The net effect of the "home solicitation sales" provisions is a
three day delay in the binding effect of such sales and an option
in the buyer to back out during that period without penalty, ex-
cept the cancellation fee. While some might criticize these provi-
sions as not directly relevant to consumer credit, but rather as
aimed at "sharp" sales practices, they do succeed in correcting a
substantial evil and for that reason are desirable. Possibly the wait-
ing period might be somewhat longer, such as one week.
C. Non-Negotiable Instruments
One of the major abuses in credit sales comes from the use of
negotiable notes. In many instances such a note is executed in favor
116 USC § 2.502(l)(2). Any expression of intent not to be bound is sufficient
notice of cancellation. USC § 2.502(4).
117 USC § 2.502(3), which requires deposit in a mailbox, with proper address and
postage prepaid.
1.8 U3C § 2.503(l), (2).
319 USC § 2.503).
120 USC § 2.504(3).
121 USC § 2-504(l), (2).
122 USC § 2.504(4).
=23 USC § 2.-505, which also provides that the seller must restore to its original
condition any property of the buyer which he has altered.
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of the seller, together with a conditional sale contract or other secu-
rity agreement. The buyer may well be under the impression that
he can refuse to pay installments which are due if the purchased
goods are defective or if there is other absence or failure of con-
sideration. Such a buyer will often find that he is compelled to deal
with a third party such as a bank or finance company, with which
he did not contemplate any relationship. If the third party has
avoided too close a relationship with the seller,124 and has remained
ignorant of the circumstances of the sale,125 he may be a holder in
due course,126 against whom the buyer has no defense.12 7
The U3C deals with this problem by flatly prohibiting the use
of negotiable notes in consumer sales or consumer lease transactions
other than those primarily for an agricultural purpose. A negotiable
note issued in violation of the U3C provision may nevertheless be
enforced by a holder in due course.12 To be really effective this
provision should not only prohibit a seller of consumer credit from
using a negotiable note, but also should bar any other person taking
a note with knowledge that it was issued in a consumer credit trans-
action from attaining holder in due course status. Subsequent takers,
124 Too close a business relationship between the finance company and the seller
has resulted in a denial of holder in due course status to the finance company. See
Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953). For a particularly flagrant
situation where due course holding was denied, see Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967).
125 See Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d
339 (1965). For an example of "too much knowledge," see Norman v. World Wide
Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
126 UN Omoa CommxRixcuL CoDE § 3-302.
127 A recent example in a case arising under the Uniform Commercial Code Is
Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964), where
the court would not permit the buyer to assert a "personal" defense against a finance
company which had taken his note and consumer obligation as holder in due course.
In Ohio, a finance company or other third person that has taken a note, together
with a chattel mortgage, conditional sale agreement, or other security agreement,
has not been denied holder in due course status merely by reason of such facts alone.
Dennis v. Rotter, 43 Ohio App. 330, 183 N.E. 188 (1932). See generally 40 Oiso JUR.
2d Negotiable Instruments §§ 353, 362; 48 Onio JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 131.
But cf. David v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950),
where holder in due course status was denied a finance company which had worked
closely with a seller of asbestos siding for dwelling houses, and was, because of Its
relationship with the seller and knowledge of seller's inferior work for others, charged
with knowledge of the seller's inferior work in the particular instance.
For general discussion, see Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955).
128 USC § 2.403.
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however, such as banks that rediscount paper without dealing with
the seller, might be permitted to qualify as holders in due course.'"
The provision might be improved by broadening its prohibi-
tion to include all negotiable instruments, rather than just notes.2 0
Moreover, the language designating the rights of a holder in due
course might be clarified by specifying that any person taking an
instrument with knowledge that it was issued in a consumer credit
sale or lease transaction, other than a sale or lease for an agricul-
tural purpose, is barred from holder in due course status. This
would make it impossible for anyone who takes a note and separate
agreement referring to a consumer credit sale or lease to qualify as
a holder in due course. Only one taking a note separated from the
agreement might so qualify.131 Nonetheless, the provision is a de-
sirable one and should provide substantial protection to consumers
by preventing many of the abuses which now exist.
The U3C does not bar the use of a negotiable note in a con-
sumer loan transaction. In rare instances abuses might arise in a
transaction where a buyer chooses to borrow from a third person
and use the loan proceeds to buy goods. Although the lender in
such circumstances will probably be completely independent of the
seller, 32 there is a possibility that the provision prohibiting nego-
tiable notes in consumer sales will be evaded by subterfuge, such
as use by the selling organization of a note which names the financer
as payee or the referral of the buyer to a related financing organiza-
tion to arrange his own financing.1 3
129 See U3C § 2.403, Comment.
130 Some clever financer might resort to use of a series of time drafts or possibly
postdated checks as an attempt to circumvent the restriction.
131 The purpose of the exception relating to a sale or lease primarily for an
agricultural purpose is also none too dear.
132 Where a money-loaning institution lends its money directly to the purchaser
of equipment for the payment of such equipment and accepts his promissory note
as evidence of the indebtedness, a failure or want of consideration in the transaction
on the part of the seller of the equipment without participation or knowledge on
the part of the loaning institution does not constitute a valid defense in an action to
collect the note, even though the note was procured from the purchaser in the first
instance by the seller and the proceeds thereof were paid by the lender directly to
him. Ohio Loan & Discount Co. v. Tyarks, 173 Ohio St. 564. 184 NX.2d 374 (1962).
133 Possibly the courts could be relied upon to maintain the "spirit" of USC
§ 2.403 on the ground that the substance of the transaction will be scrutinized, and
that only a completely independent lender dealing directly with the buyer may take
a negotiable note as holder in due course.
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D. Waiver of Defense Where Obligation Is Transferred
Related to the negotiable instrument problem is the question
of what effect should be given to a buyer's agreement not to assert
any claim or defense arising out of the sale against a transferee of
the obligation.134 Two alternatives have been proposed. The first
gives limited and delayed effect to an agreement not to assert a
defense. Such an agreement only becomes effective six months after
the transferee has given a prescribed notice to the buyer or lessee.
Prior to that time the defense may be asserted. If the transferee is
"related" to the seller or lessor,185 or a continued course of com-
plaints in connection with other transactions by the same seller or
lessor is known to the transferee, the agreement not to assert a de-
fense will be entirely inoperative. 186 The second alternative flatly
makes any transferee subject to all claims and defenses against the
seller or lessor, notwithstanding agreement to the contrary.187 Where
the sale or lease is primarily for an agricultural purpose, an agree-
ment not to assert a defense may be effective under both alterna-
tives.13 The result of either alternative should be a closer policing
by finance companies and others who discount consumer paper to
satisfy themselves of the integrity and reliability of the sellers from
whom they take such paper. 3 9
E. Other Contract Requirements and Prohibitions
Certain other contract limitations are applied to sales involv-
ing credit, leases, or loans of less than 25,000 dollars, but not to
134 Such an agreement not to assert a defense is valid, subject to any statute or
decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods.
UNrFosm Coma RciAL CODE § 9-206(1). For a lengthy collection of decisions see Annot.,
44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955); 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 106 (1967).
135 U3C § 1.302(12) states when a person is "related" to another person, both with
respect to an individual and with respect to an organization.
138 U3C § 2.404 (alternative A). In general accord, but with much shorter perlods
during which a waiver of defense is ineffective are the California Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act, CAL. Civ. CODE § 2983.5 (West Supp. 1967), (15 days), N.Y. Prsa. Paor.
LAw §§ 302(9), 403(3) (McKinney 1962) (10 days with respect to retail installment sales
generally and sales of motor vehicles).
137 U3C § 2A04 (alternative B), the text of which is virtually identical with that
of the Unruh Act of California regulating retail installment sales of goods other than
motor vehicles. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2 (West Supp. 1967). A similar provision exists
in Oregon, ORE. REv. STATs. § 83.150 (1965). With respect to motor vehicle retail in-
stallment sales, Oregon in effect prohibits negotiable notes. ORE. REv. STATS. § 83,650
(1965).
138 U3C § 2.404 (alternatives A and B).
139 A financer may discount with or without recourse and may withhold discount
proceeds in a reserve fund to cover off-sets arising from buyers' defenses.
[Vol. 29
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
real estate sales. 140 First, although contracts calling for "balloon"
payments (any payment other than the first which is more than
twice as large as the average of the other payments) are not pro-
hibited, the debtor has the right to refinance at the time the pay-
ment is due without penalty or charge and under terms no less
favorable than those of the original sale or loan. This does not
apply to a schedule of payments adjusted to a buyer's seasonal in-
come, to a credit transaction for agricultural purposes, or to a
revolving credit. 141 A special provision makes a balloon provision
at the end of a lease period void;142 and a balloon payment may
not be required in connection with a "regulated" loan of 1,000
dollars or less.143
There are also restrictions designed to prevent an overreach-
ing seller or lessor from taking a security interest in goods other
than those which are the subject of the credit sale or lease. A secu-
rity interest may not be taken on real property in connection with
a "regulated" loan of 1,000 dollars or less.144 Moreover, with lim-
ited exceptions, only the property that is sold or leased may be
security for the credit.145 There are also restrictions on the taking
of cross-collateral. A buyer may permit previously sold goods to
be security for a subsequent sale, but only until the amount of
debt arising from the original sale has been paid. 46 Where a buyer
contracts more than one indebtedness to the same seller and the
debts are consolidated, provision is made for release of the security
interests in the goods represented in the respective debts. 47
Credit sales, leases or loans secured by assignment of earn-
ings,143 the use of multiple agreements to obtain higher rates,149
140 U3C §§ 2.401, 3.401.
141 U3C §§ 2.405, 3.402.
142 USC § 2.406.
143 USC § 3.513, which requires such loans to be repayable in substantially equal
installments over a maximum range of 25 months. This is the only maximum.term
provision in the UC.
144 U3C § 3.511.
145 USC § 2.407.
146 USC § 2.408. For an example of the mischief that may arise where a creditor
retains a security interest in previously sold goods as security for subsequent sales of
other goods see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
147 USC § 2.409 (drafted in two alternatives).
148 USC §§ 2.410, 3.403. The sale of unpaid earnings is prohibited in USC § 3.109.
149 USC §§ 2.042, 3.510. In other words, a seller or lender who is permitted by
USC §§ 2.201(2)(a), 3-508(2)(a) to charge a certain rate on the first $300 may not
charge the same maximum rate on a $600 credit by setting up two different $300 sales
or loans.
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and the use of judgment notes or cognovit notes in consumer credit
transactions' 50 are declared void. Default charges may not by con-
tract be made higher than the rates authorized by the UBC.151 A
provision for attorneys' fees may be set forth in a consumer credit
agreement if limited to fifteen percent of the unpaid debt,1 2 but
no attorneys' fees may be agreed upon in connection with a "regu-
lated" loan of 1,000 dollars or less.153 The debtor is authorized to
pay the original seller, lessor, or lender until he receives notice of
the transfer of the obligation and a direction to make payment to
the transferee. 54
Two other provisions which might be said to limit traditional
freedom of contract are included in the USC. The first is directed
to referral sales 5 5 and prohibits the giving of a rebate, discount,
or other value to the buyer or lessee for the furnishing of pros-
pects' names or otherwise aiding in the making of other sales if
such rebate, discount or other value ". . is contingent upon the
occurrence of an event subsequent to the time the buyer or lessee
agrees to buy or lease."'5 51 The other provision is an "unconscion-
ability" section, generally applicable to an agreement or any clause
thereof in connection with any consumer credit sale, consumer
lease, or consumer loan, which, like the similar "unconscionability"
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 7 permits a court to
150 USC §§ 2.415, 3A07. Judgment notes are generally permitted in Ohio. 40
Omo JuR. 2d Negotiable Instruments § 154 (1967).
151 USC §§ 2.414, 3A05.
152 U3C §§ 2A13, 3.404. Reasonable expenses may also be collected.
This represents a change in Ohio law which, unlike the law of some other juris-
dictions, does not give effect to provisions in notes or other obligations for the col-
lection of attorney's fees. 40 OHio Jur. 2d Negotiable Instruments § 133 (1967).
'53 USC § 8.512.
154 U3C §§ 2.412, 3A06, which give the debtor the same rights as are given the
debtor in a secured transaction under UNIORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 9-318(3), where
there is an assignment of a security interest.
155 For cases dealing with this sometimes unsavory practice of making an over-
priced sale coupled with a promise (often never carried out) to rebate for any referrals
to other prospects by the buyer that also result in a sale see Norman v. World Wide
Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 58, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); Sherwood & Roberts Yaklmna,
Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965); Annot., 14 A.L.R.Sd 1420 (1967).
156 UBC § 2.411.
157 UNIFORI COMIsMERCUAL CODE § 2.302, which was applied or at least furthered
the action of the court in such "consumer credit" cases as American Home Improve-
ment, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); State v. ITM, Inc., 52
Misc. 2d 89, 275 N.YS.2d S03 (1966).
It might be noted that the Uniform Commercial Code unconsclonability pro-
vision deals with the sale of goods only. There is no counterpart of Article 9 on
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strike down a contract or term thereof on the ground of "uncon-
scionability."'58 In general such limitations are desirable in that
they eliminate many abuses which have made consumer-debtors
the victims of overreaching or unscrupulous sellers and creditors.1 59
VI. A HEDGE AGAINST INFLATION
The U8C contains a novel and perhaps controversial provi-
sion. A number of dollar amounts stated in various sections of
the Act are subject to change
*.. in accordance with and to the extent of changes in the
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical
Workers: U.S. City Average, all Items, 1957-59 = 100, compiled
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department
of Labor, and hereafter referred to as the Index. The Index
for December, 1967, is the Reference Base Index.16
The changes are to be made when there is a change in the
Index of ten percent or some multiple thereof, but only changes
of an even ten percent or multiple thereof are to be made. For
example, a rise in the Index of ten percent could result in the rais-
ing of the maximum rate differentials to cover the first 330 dollars,
rather than the first 300 dollars, at the highest rate, the amount
from 30 dollars to 1,100 dollars, rather than from 300 dollars to
1,000 dollars, at the next rate, and over 1,100 dollars rather than
over 1,000 dollars, at a lower maximum rate.16'
Many, if not most, of the dollar amounts stated in various
parts of the U3G are subject to similar change if the Index changes
by ten percent or some multiple thereof. Substantial confusion will
secured transactions. See In re Advance Printing and Litho Company, 277 F. Supp. 101
(E.D. Pa.), ajfd, 387 F.2d 952 (Sd Cir. 1967).
158 U3C § 5.106. This provision is set forth as a remedial, not a substantive, sec-
tion of the U3C, but it would seem to be substantive in its possible application, and
might be regarded as an additional contract limitation prohibiting unconsdonability.
159 The unconsdonability provision, U3C § 5.106, might be criticized, as has the
similar Uniform Commercial Code provision, on the ground that it affords to a court
too much discretion to make "indefinite" law. However, the Uniform Commercial
Code provision has not been judicially abused to date. Moreover, several courts have
indicated that a court will override an "unconscionable" contractual provision, not-
withstanding the non-existence of an express statutory provision on "unconscdon-
ability." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir, 1965);
Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 252 A.2d 405 (1967), both involving pre.Uniform Com-
mercial Code fact situations.
16D U3C § 1.106(1).
161 The amounts of $300 and $1,000 axe declared subject to change under U3C
§ 1.106. See USC §§ 2.201(6), 3.508(6), in all alternatives.
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likely result from subjecting so many dollar amounts to change
with Index variations. The benefit of providing a statutory hedge
against inflation seems more than negated by such confusion. If a
statutory hedge against inflation is deemed desirable, only a few
of the more important dollar amounts should be so subjected. An-
other serious objection is that the changes will in most instances
produce amounts that are not in round numbers. 102 This writer
therefore suggests that the "change" provision of the U3C be either
eliminated or redrafted so that changes of the Index will affect
fewer dollar amounts and will be made in such a manner as to
retain round figures and even-dollar amounts.
Other possible objections to the "anti-inflation" provision of
the U3C deserve mention. For one thing, although it is made man-
datory for the administrator or supervisor of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code in each state to issue a rule announcing the
changes, 163 there is a practical problem of continuing uniformity
in the U3C if it is left to the administrators of fifty states (assum-
ing all adopt the identical text of the USC) to declare the changes. 10 4
Furthermore, it might be difficult to obtain enactment of the U3C
in some states if the local legislatures are to find that the sum of
300 dollars now means 330 dollars and that there is a similar change
in other figures.1 65 Finally, a constitutional problem might exist
when the operation of a state statute is made dependent upon fig-
ures compiled by a federal bureau or agency not subject to the
jurisdiction of the local legislature.06
VII. CONCLUSION
In spite of the various criticisms which can be leveled at cer-
tain provisions of the U3C, the current draft is on the whole a
162 A statutory delineation between such amounts as the first $300 and from $500
to $1,000 is handier to deal with than one between" the first $330 and amounts from
$330 to $1,100. Even more of a problem is a delineation that changes from small
even-dollar amounts, such as $2 and $5 to amounts expressed in dollars and cents,
such as $2.20 and $5.50. The latter figures represent the maximum delinquency
charges which may be collected under USC §§ 2.20S(l)(a), 3203(1)(a).
163 USC § 1.106(3),(4) which speaks in terms of "shall."
164 Proceedings, supra note 2, at 4A-7, discussing USC § 1.106.
165 USC § 1.106(4) so requires. This could also result in varying U3C § 1.106 to
choose a different reference base index than that of December, 1967, if the statute is
enacted in a particular state at some later time.
166 Proceedings, supra note 2, at 4A. This might be deemed an unconstitutional
delegation of authority to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, which Is not
charged with enforcing the USC.
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commendable and a superior job. The draftsmen have attained
a workable balance between the protection of the consumer-debtor
and the right of a person extending credit to have just debts re-
paid and to make a reasonable profit in his business of marketing
money. The U3C affords consumer protections which exceed those
found in most existing state statutes dealing with consumer credit;1"
yet the draftsmen and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
take the realistic position that consumer credit should be sensibly
regulated, not stifled, and that the business of extending credit to
consumers is a desirable public service, notwithstanding the abuses
which may occur in extension of such credit.16
The current draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is
far superior to the confused mass of diverse and piecemeal statutes
which now exist;169 and enactment of this Code in its present or
similar form would represent a great stride in the development of
a workable statutory pattern for control of consumer credit trans-
actions.
167 Examples are the "disclosure" provisions, the provisions dealing with home
solicitation sales, those restricting such matters as judgment notes, balloon payments,
referral sales, and wage assignments, as well a those prohibiting the use of negotiable
notes in connection with credit sales, all discussed above.
168 Examples include the setting of relatively high maximum rates, the furthering
of competition in the consumer credit industry by such methods as "open" licensing
provisions limited to lenders only, and the elimination of such traps for the unwary
lender as general usury statutes, all discussed above.
169 An analogy might be drawn by comparing Article 9 of the Uniform Commerdal
Code on secured transactions with the diversity of piecemeal prior statutes and rules
of case law on such matters as pledges, chattel mortgages, conditional sales, bailment
-leases, trust receipts, assignments of accounts receivable, and factor's liens. Article 9
is not perfect and has generated considerable criticism; yet, it represents substantial
improvement over former secured transactions law. In the same way, the USC represents
substantial improvement over prior consumer credit law.
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